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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmABSTRACT 
This paper estimates the losses embedded in the capital positions of the 996 FSLIC-insured 
savings and loan institutions that did not meet capital standards at the end of the 1970s.  We 
compare the estimated cost of resolving the insolvencies of these institutions at the end of the 
1970s with the actual failure-resolution costs for those that were closed  by  July 3 1, 1992, 
and the projected resolution costs for the remaining thrifts that are likely to be closed.  Our 
results show that even when one considers only the direct costs associated with delayed 
closure of economically failed thrifts, these costs significantly exceed reasonable estimates of 
the cost of prompt failure resolution. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmCapital Forbearance and Thrifts: 
An Ex Post Examination of Regulatory Gambling 
The Federal Reserve System's October 1979 commitment to reduce inflation resulted in 
historically high interest rates in the early 1980s.  The three-month Treasury bill rate, which 
had stood at 6.49 percent in January  1980, rose to a peak of 16.30 percent in May  1981 and 
returned to the single-digit range by  August 1982 (see White [1991, table 5-11).  Although 
this policy successfully lowered the inflation rate and set the stage for lower interest rates 
throughout the  1980s, it had a devastating impact on savings and loan (thrift) institutions. 
The industry's portfolio, which consisted of long-term fixed-rate loans (principally mortgages) 
financed with short-term liabilities (principally deposits), had a negative duration gap that 
made it extremely vulnerable to sudden, unexpected increases in  interest rates.  For many 
thrifts, the surge in interest rates in  the early 1980s was the final blow to a capital position 
that had been gradually eroded by  inflation during the latter half of the 1970s.  By  1982, 
unbooked capital losses on thrifts' balance sheets not only exceeded book  equity at a large 
number of institutions, but also surpassed the explicit resources of the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation's (FSLIC) deposit insurance fund. 
From the late 1970s through mid- 1989, regulators, gambling that unexpectedly lower 
interest rates would restore thrift institutions to health, progressed through several stages in 
their attempts to push the ultimate resolution of the FSLIC's insolvency into the future.  They 
dramatically reduced the required capital ratio and even permitted a number of thrifts deemed 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfminsolvent under regulatory accounting principles (RAP) to continue to operate.' 
RAP is a historical cost accounting system that measures solvency as the difference 
between the book value of assets and liabilities.  No adjustment is made to account for 
unbooked losses or for market-related changes in the value of assets and liabilities.  Market- 
based measures of solvency explicitly incorporate these market-related changes in values and 
therefore give a more accurate measure of the true condition of the firm.  In the case of 
thrifts, historical cost accounting significantly overstated the true solvency of thrifts in the 
early 1980s because of substantial unbooked losses on their mortgage portfolios due to a 
dramatic increase in market interest rates.2 
The official response to the insolvency of the thrift industry and the FSLIC can be 
characterized as a bet made by  policymakers that by  forestalling the ultimate resolution of the 
"crisis," the bill presented to taxpayers would be less.  In this paper, we explicitly determine 
whether taxpayers won that bet by  analyzing the direct costs of regulatory forbearance, 
specifically those directly related to resolving the insolvency of FSLIC-insured thrifts. 
Because we ignore important secondary costs associated with the incentive effects of 
forbearance and spillover effects, our estimate of the cost of forbearance is likely to 
significantly understate the true cost. 
- 
'A  1987 U.S. General Accounting Office study shows that in September 1986, 219 RAP-insolvent 
FSLIC-insured thrifts were in operation and another 250 had RAP net worth of less than 0.5 percent (see U. S. 
GAO [1987a, table 1.51). 
RAP net worth is one of three measures of solvency based on  historical cost.  The other two are 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) net worth and tangible net worth (TNW).  While there is a 
great deal of divergence among RAP net worth, GAAP net worth, and TNW over the time period studied, these 
three book-value measures of solvency give a very similar picture of the thrift industry in December  1979. 
RAP net worth, however, became an even less-reliable measure of solvency over the  1980s as  policymakers 
artificially augmented the measure. 
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recognition of the insolvency of a larger number of thrifts (and the consequent insolvency of 
the FSLIC), were the total losses reduced?  To determine this, we compute marked-to-market 
estimates of the embedded losses on the books of FSLIC-insured thrifts that failed to meet 
accounting-based minimum regulatory capital standards on December 3 1,  1979.  These 
embedded losses, which are estimates of prompt resolution costs, are then compared to the 
discounted present value of future resolution costs associated with the subset of sample 
institutions that have been closed or are likely to be  closed by  the thrift regulatory agency. 
We find that taxpayers lost the forbearance bet, as the present value of future closure costs is 
more than double the cost of prompt intervention. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section I presents forbearance as a regulatory 
gamble.  Section II  sets up the null and alternative hypothesis and the sample selection 
criteria, and section 111 presents the empirical methods and results.  Conclusions and policy 
recommendations appear in section IV. 
I.  Forbearance as a Regulatory Gamble 
The initial policy response to the insolvency of the thrift industry was capital forbearance. 
Both the Deposit Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980  (DIDMCA) 
and the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982 aimed at providing relief for the thrift ind~stry.~  These 
3~~~~~~  was the first in a series of actions taken by  legislators and regulators to grant thrifts new 
investment powers.  It  authorized federally chartered SCLs to invest up to 20 percent of their assets in 
corporate bonds and consumer loans and extended their authority to make construction or acquisition loans. 
The portfolio investment limits for commercial and consumer loans were raised further by  the Garn-St Germain 
Act. 
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thrift capital requirements and the introduction of RAP to mask the true insolvency of the 
ind~stry.~  Policymakers, reasoning that unexpectedly lower rates or more-diversified assets 
would restore these institutions to health, chose to forbear and took actions to cover up 
emerging problems in the industry.  This interest-rate bet was not symmetric, however, as the 
prepayment option held by  mortgagors made interest-rate declines less profitable for thrifts 
than increases would be costly. 
Capital forbearance was (and is) attractive to policymakers for three reasons.  First, as 
Kane (1989% ch. 4;  1989b) argues, the classic principal-agent conflict described by  Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) exists in public agencies.  In other words, bank and thrift regulatory 
agencies are self-maximizing bureaucracies whose primary task may be conceived as acting as 
the agent for taxpayers (the government's principal) to ensure a safe and sound banking 
system and to minimize their loss exposure. Regulators also must cater to a political clientele 
who are intermediate or competing principals. Furthermore, regulators are sometimes 
motivated by  their own self-interest, which may not coincide with the interests of taxpayers. 
These political pressures and self-interest considerations create socially perverse incentives 
that make forbearance an appealing alternative to dealing with emerging problems both early 
Capital forbearance had two components.  First, regulators systematically lowered the actual 
requirement from 5 to 3 percent of assets.  In November  1980, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) 
both reduced thrifts' explicit capital requirement from approximately 5 to about 4 percent and provided for a 
"qualifying balance deduction" that effectively lowered the requirement even more.  In January 1982, the capital 
requirement was further reduced to 3 percent.  After  1987, thrift regulators largely ignored capital standards. 
Second, policymakers adopted regulatory accounting principles that represented a departure from GAAP 
accounting. In November 198  1, the FHLBB accepted net-worth certificates from thrifts with less than 3 percent 
net worth as capital in exchange for FSLIC promissory notes, with face value guaranteed by  the FSLIC. In July 
1982, thrift regulators permitted goodwill to be amortized over a 40-year period and allowed income from 
unbooked gains to be realized in as little as five years. Finally, in November  1982, the FHLBB began to include 
"appraised equity capital" in its calculations of regulatory net worth.  For a more complete accounting of 
forbearances, see Barth and Bradley (1989), Kane (1989a), and White (1991). 
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for bureaucratic-minded managers of financial services regulatory agencies and their political 
constituencies even if it is not a fair bet for taxpayers. 
In the early 1980s, forbearance also became an attractive alternative for policymakers 
because the unbooked losses on the balance sheets of thrifts, and hence of the FSLIC, were 
initially the result of unexpectedly high interest rates at that time. Policymakers hoped that if 
interest rates returned to lower levels, many  of the nonviable thrifts would recover.  Such an 
interest-rate bet is a form of regulatory gambling (Kane [1989a, ch. 51). 
The  third reason for forbearance's appeal to policymakers is that the FSLIC did not 
have the explicit resources to deal with the losses.  As Kane (1986), Demirgiic-Kunt (1991), 
and Thomson (1992) show, liquidity constraints reduce the ability of regulators to close 
insolvent institutions.  Given the unwillingness of the President to request and Congress to 
allocate sufficient funds to recapitalize the FSLIC in  the early 1980s, thrift regulators could 
not have moved decisively against a large number of insolvent savings and loans, even if it 
had been in their self-interest to do so. 
Finally, in August 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, 
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) to provide money and a regulatory structure for dealing with 
and resolving the crisis.'  The initial estimate of the cost of disposing of some 500 hopelessly 
insolvent thrifts was projected to be $124 billion (Pauley [1989]), but it is now clear that the 
true cost of the thrift debacle will exceed $200 billion. 
'~nfortunatel~,  this landmark piece of legislation failed to provide sufficient funds to resolve the  FSLIC 
insolvency.  It  also created a public salvage mechanism, known as the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), 
with an  implicit mandate to jointly minimize the financial costs and the political costs associated with the 
resolution of the thrift insurance mess (see Kane [I9901 and Pike and Thomson [199]]). 
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staggering, it has not been demonstrated that taxpayers lost the gamble.  Kane (1985, ch. 4) 
estimates that the embedded losses in the FSLIC fund were in excess of $100 billion as early 
as 1982.6 On the other hand, previous studies of thrifts that were either GAAP insolvent or 
undercapitalized in the early  1980s found that, despite the dramatic decrease in interest rates 
after 1982, the majority of thrifts receiving capital forbearance failed to recover later. 
The first study, done by  the U.S. General Accounting Office (U.S. GAO [1987a]), 
covers December 1982 through September 1986.  The sample consists of 222 firms that were 
insolvent according to GAAP net worth in December 1982.  By  September 1986, 77 of these 
thrifts had merged, were closed, or required FSLIC assistance to remain open.  Of the 
surviving firms, 80 remained GAAP insolvent and 65 regained GAAP solvency.  Only 25 of 
the GAAP-solvent firms had GAAP net-worth-to-asset ratios above 3 percent.' 
Rudolph (1989) looks at the 237 thrifts that were GAAP insolvent at year-end  1982. 
Tracing these firms into the future, she finds that by  the close of 1987, 69 of these firms had 
merged and another 23 were closed or required FSLIC assistance to remain open.  Of the 145 
thrifts still in  existence in December 1987, 77 remained GAAP insolvent and 68 regained 
GAAP solvency. 
DeGennaro, Lang, and Thomson (1991) study the differences in operating strategies 
kane's estimate was  recently validated by  former FHLBB Chairman Richard Pratt (1990). who testified 
before Congress that by  1982, the FSLIC insurance reserve was a negative $100 billion. 
'GAO  also examined an additional sample of 916 thrifts that had GAAP  net-worth-to-asset ratios between 
0 and 3 percent in December  1982. By  September 1986, 170 of these marginally book-solvent firms had 
merged, were closed, or required FSLIC assistance to remain open. Of those thrifts that were still operating by 
September 1986, 280 remained marginally solvent by  GAAP  standards and 186 had become GAAP  insolvent. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmbetween troubled thrifts that recover and those that do not.  Their sample consists of the 300 
largest thrifts that had a GAAP net-worth-to-assets ratio of less than 5 percent at year-end 
1979.  By December 1989, 75 of the thrifts in the sample were closed or required FSLIC 
assistance to remain open, 90 had merged into another thrift, and 63 failed to meet FIRREA 
capital standards (ratios of 3 percent GAAP net worth to assets and  1.5 percent tangible net 
worth to assets).  They further note that only 39 of the thrifts in their sample had GAAP net- 
worth-to-asset ratios above 5 percent by  the end of  1989. 
Although these studies show that very few capital-deficient thrifts returned to health 
and therefore support the hypothesis that forbearance was a losing proposition for taxpayers, 
none of them attempts to compute the attendant costs. That is, none of these studies compares 
the cost of taking action against undercapitalized thrifts at the beginning of the 1980s with the 
ultimate cost of closing the subset of forbearance thrifts that failed to  recover. 
To date, the Congressional Budget Office has produced one of the few analyses of the 
direct costs of forbearance (Bartholomew [1991]).  This study examines 1,130 thrifts that 
were resolved (at a cost to the FSLIC or the RTC) between January  1, 1980 and December 
3 1, 1990 or that were projected to be resolved during 1991.  The actual resolution cost for 
each institution at the time it was closed (and then projected costs for 1991 resolutions) is 
compared with the estimated cost associated with closing the thrift when its tangible net 
worth (TNW) became negative.  The difference between these two costs, adjusted for  - 
inflation, is Bartholomew's estimate of the cost of forbearance.  This study suggests that 
prompt closure of thrifts when they became TNW insolvent could have saved taxpayers as 
much as $66 billion (in 1990 dollars). 
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between the estimated resolution cost at the time a thrift is closed and the projected cost of 
regulatory intervention at an earlier date.  However, there are a number of important 
differences.  First, instead of defining forbearance as the failure of regulators to close thrifts 
when they become TNW insolvent, we define it as the failure of policymakers to enforce 
capital standards.  Thus, our initial sample consists of the 996 FSLIC-insured thrifts that 
failed to meet capital standards in December 1979.~  While both analyses consider the cost of 
delayed closure, our study is focused on the forbearance bet made by  policymakers at the end 
of  the ,1970s. 
The second difference between our study and Bartholomew's is that we set up  an ex 
ante forbearance bet, rather than an ex post bet.  We include all book-capital-deficient thrifts 
as of December 3 1, 1979, whereas Bartholomew looks at all institutions that were resolved (at 
a cost to the FSLIC or RTC) from 1980 to 1990 and at those thrifts likely to be resolved in 
1991.  In other words, the Bartholomew study is limited to failed institutions, while ours 
includes all capital-deficient thrifts on the event date.  This removes an important source of 
bias in  the Bartholomew study.  By  omitting the thrifts that became TNW insolvent but 
subsequently recovered, Bartholomew understates,  the true costs of prompt resolution and 
therefore may overstate the cost of forbearance. 
On  the other hand, omitting insolvent thrifts that subsequently recovered may also 
8 Our sample screen initially identified 998 thrifts that failed to meet capital standards in December  1979. 
However, upon closer inspection, we identified two thrifts in the sample that were newly chartered in  1979. 
Regulators would be unlikely to  allow a new thrift to open that did not meet capital standards; thus, we 
assumed  that our sample screen misidentified these institutions and removed them from the sample.  Note that 
one of these thrifts was closed in  September 1989 and the other was still operating as an independent thrift as 
of July 3 1, 1992. 
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downside loss from forbearance, but did not share in any of the upside gains past the point 
where the thrift had zero liquidation value.  These upside gains would have accrued to the 
government had it nationalized the institution and later sold it. By choosing forbearance, the 
government essentially nationalized the downside risk and privatized the upside gains.  This 
bias is also present in  our study. 
A third way  our study differs from Bartholomew's is in our method for determining 
unbooked losses in thrift portfolios at the event date.  We use Kane-Yu's  (Kane [1991], Kane 
and Yu  [1992]) marked-to-market procedure to compute the embedded losses on the balance 
sheets of our sample thrifts.  In contrast, Bartholomew calculates the cost of prompt resolution 
by  assuming the underlying sources of the embedded losses are the same on the event date 
and on the resolution date.  This is an important untested maintained hypothesis, which Barth, 
Bartholomew, and Bradley (1990), Cole, McKenzie, and White (1991), DeGennaro, Lang, and 
Thomson (1991), and White (1991) imply does not hold.  In fact, both White and Barth, 
Bartholomew, and Bradley suggest the presence of  as many as three different regimes during 
the sample period used  in both this and the Bartholomew study.  Finally, Bartholomew's 
method of adjusting the spread between the estimated prompt resolution cost and the future 
resolution cost is not fully adjusted for inflation, nor does it consider the time value of 
money.  We fully account for both effects, however, by  using the discounted present value of 
future resolution costs in constructing our cost of f~rbearance.~ 
9~e  do not, however, want to minimize the  importance of Bartholomew's study. His results represent an 
additional piece of evidence supporting our null hypothesis that the forbearance bet was a losing proposition for 
taxpayers. 
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Webster's defines forbearance as "a  refraining from  the enforcement of something (as a debt, 
right, or obligation) that is due.'"'  In this paper, forbearance is narrowly defined as the 
decision by  regulators and policymakers not to enforce capital standards at the end of the 
1970s.  Therefore, for our purposes a forbearance thrift is one that did not meet the 
accounting-based regulatory capital test on December 3 1, 1979. 
Of the 4,038 FSLIC-insured thrifts in existence in  1979, 996 failed to meet the 
minimum regulatory capital standard.  This was an accounting-based standard requiring thrifts 
to meet two capital tests: a federal insurance reserve test, which essentially was a maximum 
leveraging test; and an asset composition test, which was in essence a risk-based capital test. 
Both of these capital tests are described in appendix A.  The fact that nearly 25 percent of all 
FSLIC-insured thrifts failed to meet book-value-based regulatory capital standards at the end 
of  1979 is startling, because these standards do not take into account the interest-rate-related 
capital losses on thrift balance sheets at that time.  As we show later, the size of the 
unbooked losses on the balance sheets of these 996 institutions suggests that a high 
percentage of the thrifts that met the capital standards on December 3 1,  1979 were market- 
value insolvent. 
In constructing our final sample, we make the additional assumption that thrift 
regulators could have acted either to force the recapitalization of, to close or merge, or to take 
into government conservatorship (nationalize) all 996 capital-deficient thrifts by  the end of 
1980.  Therefore, we exclude from the sample the nine thrifts that were closed in  1980 and 
'Osee Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, Springfield, MA:  Merrism-Webster Inc., 1986, p. 482. 
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forbearance thrifts, which we use to test the following hypotheses: 
HO:  Taxpayers lost the forbearance bet.  The present value of future losses associated with 
insolvency resolution of the 952 forbearance thrifts exceeds the estimated cost of 
prompt resolution in  1980. 
HI: Taxpayers won the forbearance bet.  The present value of future resolution costs 
associated with the 952 forbearance thrifts that fail or are projected to fail is less than 
the estimated cost associated with  prompt resolution. 
Note that by  focusing our test on the direct costs associated with the resolution of the 
forbearance thrifts, we are ignoring important secondary costs.  Specifically, the adoption of 
capital forbearance policies increased the risk-taking incentives for all insured depository 
institutions.  This, in  turn, led to a misallocation of resources and deadweight losses to the 
economy.  Hendershott and Kane (1992) argue that thrift forbearance was a major 
contributing factor in the real estate construction boom, estimating the deadweight losses in 
this market to be between $124 billion and $150 billion.  The Congressional Budget Office 
(1  992) calculates that the misallocation of resources associated with the thrift insurance mess 
produced a deadweight loss of $200 billion (in 1990 dollars) in foregone GNP  from 1981 
through 1990, and that the total loss in potential GNP  by  the year 2000 will be on the order 
of $500 billion (in  1990 dollars). 
Another indirect cost of thrift forbearance was the destabilization of the depository 
institutions industry.  The profitability of the healthy segment of this industry was reduced as 
insolvent thrifts, in a desperate attempt to regain solvency, bid down lending rates and bid up 
deposit rates to unsustainable levels. This spillover effect has been described by  Kane (1989% 
pp. 4-9, who refers to the insolvent but open thrifts as "institutional zombies."  Finally, 
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thrift behavior in deposit markets.  Federally insured certificates of deposit and Treasury bills 
are close substitutes (made even closer substitutes by  forbearance). As zombie thrifts bid  up 
the rates offered on quasi-government debt, they drove up the required rate of return on 
official U.S. Treasury debt.  Shoven, Smart, and Waldfogel suggest that the thrift insurance 
mess may have increased the borrowing costs of the U.S. Treasury by  as much as $100 
billion (in 1990 dollars) per year by  the end of the 1980s. 
In any event, although the above indirect costs of forbearance are not mutually 
exclusive and are difficult to quantify, they are real and economically significant. Therefore, 
our focus on the direct costs of forbearance will cause us to understate the true costs of 
forbearance and bias us against accepting the null hypothesis. 
111.  Measuring the Cost of Forbearance 
To measure the cost of forbearance, we need an estimate of the costs of prompt intervention 
during 1980 and a present-value estimate of the actual or projected future costs of resolving 
those forbearance thrifts that did not recover by  December 3 1, 1991. 
952  952 
Forbearance = z  Max(0,  -1.0*~V79~)  -z  AM=(  0.  RESCOSTi, t)  (1  ) 
1-1  *.I  (l-~t)~ 
In equation (I), MV79, is thrift i's marked-to-market value of equity adjusted for fixed costs 
of bankruptcy, and RESCOST,  is the actual estimated resolution cost or projected resolution 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmcost at time t associated with closing thrift i."  For example, if the thrift was closed in  1986, t 
equals 6 (t = 86 - 80). For insolvent but still operating (zombie) thrifts, the closure year is 
assumed to be 1992 and, therefore, t = 12.  Finally, r,  is the appropriate one-period discount 
factor corresponding to period t. 
A.  Method for Constructing Estimates of Prompt Resolution Costs 
To estimate the embedded losses on the balance sheets of forbearance thrifts, we use the 
synthetic market value accounting method of Kane-Yu (1992). Kane-Yu construct market 
values for thrift asset and liability subportfolios by  comparing realized rates of return on each 
subportfolio to an alternative market rate of return.  Their basic formula is 
where MV,  and BV,  are the market and book value of assets (liabilities) at time 0 in 
subportfolio x; R and r are the rate of return on the subportfolio and equivalent market rate of 
return, respectively; and m is the number of periods until the subportfolio matures. Equation 
(2) assumes the subportfolio is an annuity, with m future payments and no prepayment. 
 h he actual resolution cost is really an estimate of the losses to the FSLIC or RTC at the time the thrift is 
closed. Ultimate resolution costs may be higher or  lower depending on the final salvage value of the thrift's 
assets retained or guaranteed by  the FSLIC or RTC.  For example, the FDIC's August 1990 estimate of the 
present-value cost of the  1988 resolutions and stabilizations was $47 billion, as opposed to the FHLBB's 1988 
estimate of  $38 billion (Barth [ 199  1, p. 3 11). The cost to taxpayers could also be higher than the cost to the 
FSLIC (for cases before  1989) if the FSLIC transferred tax-loss credits to the acquirer at the time of resolution. 
Moreover, Kane's (1989a, 1989b) principal-agent model of financial services regulatory behavior suggests that 
unless these regulators are "faithful public servants," the estimated resolution cost will be a low-biased estimate 
of the true cost. 
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(overstate) the market value of the subportfolio. 
We define the cost of prompt resolution as the minimum of synthetic net worth (less 
fixed resolution costs) and zero.  As seen in equation (3) below, SNW is constructed by 
adding (subtracting) the difference between the market and book values of the m asset (n 
liability) subportfolios from balance sheet TNW: 
Using data from the December 3 1, 1979 Thrift Financial Report, we divide thrift 
balance sheets into net worth, four liability subportfolios, and eight asset subportfolios (see 
table I and appendix B).  Using equation (2), we  construct synthetic market values for all of 
the asset and liability subportfolios, except for all other assets and other liabilities, for which 
we assume BV equals MV. 
To calculate synthetic market values for each asset and liability subportfolio, we 
construct measures of book assets (liabilities), book return on assets (liabilities), and a market 
rate of return on an asset or portfolio with similar risk characteristics.  The level of 
aggregation within each subportfolio is determined by  the availability of information in the 
Thrifr Financial Report for computing book asset returns, and on the availability of an 
equivalent market rate of return. 
Ideally, we would also subdivide each subportfolio into a number of maturity buckets 
for determining m in equation (2) and thereby improve the precision of the synthetic market- 
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cases, however, we have information on the average life of the assets in the subportfolios and, 
therefore, we havea good estimate of m.  In the few cases for which information on m is not 
available, the size of the subportfolio relative to total assets is typically small.  Moreover, the 
sensitivity of the results to the choice of m is easily explored. 
Finally, with the exception of the real estate subportfolio, BV for each subportfolio 
consists of assets net of slow loans (nonperforming loans) and net of loans in process.  By 
netting slow loans and loans in  process from the subportfolios, we reduce those subportfolios 
to assets that are currently accruing interest.  Because subportfolio assets enter into the 
denominator of the book  return on assets, R, the use of net rather than gross assets removes 
an important downward bias in  R, and therefore in MV.  The unbooked loss associated with 
slow loans is separately deducted from TNW  in  arriving at SNW. 
Subportfolio returns are calculated by  dividing income (interest, dividends, fees, and 
accrued interest receivable) by  net assets.  We add implicit interest earned on escrow accounts 
to mortgage income in the calculation of the return on the mortgage portfolios.  Implicit 
interest is assumed to accrue to escrow accounts every three months.  at the three-month CD 
rate.I2 In addition, in  cases in which accrued interest receivable is reported on an aggregate 
basis, as is true for mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, we prorate it across 
subportfolios according to relative assets.  In the case of mortgage servicing rights, we 
compute the return on assets as the difference between the income earned per dollar of 
l2 The annual  three-month CD rate on December 1979 was  13.43 percent. See table  1.36, "Interest Rates: 
Money and Capital Markets,"  Federal Reserve Bullefin (March 1980), p. A27. 
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mortgages) and the cost of servicing the mortgages, which we assume is 25 basis points on 
the outstanding balance of mortgages serviced."  Net subportfolio assets and the book return 
on assets for each subportfolio can be found in table 11.  The alternative market rates of return 
for each subportfolio are either published rates of return for December 1979 or rates of return 
constructed using data from December 1979.  A summary of these returns and their sources 
appears in appendix C. 
We use equation (2) to construct synthetic market values for the subportfolios, with 
the exception of real estate, service corporation subsidiaries, FHLBB advances (< 1 year), 
borrowings (other borrowed money < 1 year), all other assets, and other liabilities.  For the 
real  estate subportfolio, we assume that assets were booked at market value; because of data 
constraints, we assume they were held an average of two years.14 For real estate, MV  equals 
BV multiplied by  one plus the average annual change in Russell's national real estate price 
index from White (1991, table 6-10)."  For servic;  corporation subsidiaries, MV is the value 
of the following perpetuity:  service corporation subsidiary net income divided by  the 1979 
annual return on Standard & Poor's 500 stock index.  If either the net income figure or the 
13 Kane-Yu assume the cost of mortgage servicing is 20 basis points.  Other sources suggest that the fees 
thrifts charge for mortgage servicing range from 25 to 44 basis points on the outstanding mortgage balance. 
See Secondary Mortgage Markers 6 (Winter 1989190). 
14~ane-yu  assume two years for real estate held for investment and four years for other real estate owned. 
While the two-year assumption is ad hoc, it derives from necessity, as our data source on real estate prices 
begins at the end of  1977. 
Is Recent work by  Hendershott and Kane (1992) suggests that from  1982 to  1991, the  Russell index was 
severely biased upward.  This suggests that our use of the Russell index from 1977 to  1979  may  lead us to 
overstate the market value of thrift real estate holdings.  However, given the relatively small share of thrift 
assets in real estate in December  1979  (0.4 percent of total assets), this potential bias will not qualitatively 
affect the results. 
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BV.  For FHLBB advances (< 1 year) and borrowings (other borrowed money < 1 year), MV 
is computed by discounting the principal plus interest of these parts of the FHLBB advances 
and borrowings subportfolios using the six-month secondary market CD rate.  Finally, as 
noted earlier, we assume MV  equals BV for all other assets and for other liabilities.  The 
equations used to construct the MVs for each subportfolio are reported in  appendix D. 
B.  Estimates of  Prompt Resolution Costs 
Table 111  presents the estimates of unbooked losses or gains in the subportfolios (BV  minus 
MV)  for the 952 forbearance thrifts in December  1979.  On  average, unbooked losses on the 
mortgage portfolio  are 1.45 times TNW, 6.68 percent of subporlfolio assets, and 60 percent of 
total unbooked losses.  Service corporation subsidiaries, mortgage-backed securities, and other 
loan subportfolios have higher market-to-book discounts (or pseudo default rates) -- 40.10 
percent,  14.32 percent, and  10.59 percent, respectively.  However, since these subportfolios 
combined account for only 7.4 percent of  total assets, as opposed to 78 percent for 
mortgages, the total unbooked losses on these subportfolios are less than 60 percent of TNW. 
On the liability side, unbooked gains on fixed-rate deposits are 82.04 percent of TNW and are 
eight times the size (in absolute value) of the unbooked gains of FHLBB advances and 
borrowings combined. Overall, unbooked gains and losses for sample thrifts are 2.39 times 
TNW. 
As seen in table IV, total unbooked losses in  December 1979 exceeded the forbearance 
thrift's tangible net worth by  $7.44 billion.  Synthetic net worth as a percent of total assets 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm(SNWA) is -5.63 percent for the sample.  This market-based measure of solvency gives a 
much different and more realistic picture of the condition of the thrift industry in 1979 than 
do book measures of net worth. 
Like other published estimates of market net worth for banks and thrifts, our SNW 
measure is sensitive to particular assumptions. While the choices of alternative market rates of 
return are clear, some of the maturity assumptions are ad hoc. Thus, we investigated the 
sensitivity of the synthetic net worth estimate to the maturity assumptions for all subportfolios 
for which the ratio of subportfolio assets to total assets exceeds 5 percent.I6 Two asset 
subportfolios and one liability subportfolio exceeded this threshold: mortgages (78.48 percent), 
investments (6.30 percent), and fixed-rate deposits (60.85 percent). 
For mortgages, we reconstructed synthetic market values using  10 years and  14 years 
of maturity instead of  12. In addition to the five-year maturity assumed in computing the 
numbers in table 111, we computed synthetic market values for the investment subportfolio 
using two- and  10-year maturity assumptions. Finally, we computed synthetic net worth for 
fixed-rate deposits assuming maturities of one year and four years.  Given these maturity 
assumptions, the smallest SNW we  can construct is when m = (14, 2, 4), and the largest SNW 
is arrived at when m = (10, 10, 1) for mortgages, investments, and fixed-rate deposits, 
respectively.  Under these extreme combinations, the SNW (SNWA) for the sample ranges 
'%HLBB  advances are divided into long- and short-term advances for purposes of synthetic market value 
accounting.  While total advances fund 8.52 percent of the average  forbearance thrift's assets, long-term and 
short-term advances are used to fund 4.95 and 3.57 percent of assets, respectively.  Therefore, neither portion of 
the subportfolio itself meets our 5 percent of  assets threshold.  Furthermore, the six-month maturity assumption 
for short-term FHLBB advances is reasonable, and alternative values make little difference.  The 3.47-year 
maturity assumed for long-tenn advances is the industry average published by  the FHLBB (see appendix C). 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmfrom a low of -$13.81 billion (-9.90 percent) to a high of -$4.90 billion (-3.51  percent)." 
To arrive at the cost of prompt resolution (that is, the cost of closing these thrifts in 
1980), we need to make some adjustments to the SNW estimate.  First, we must adjust for the 
value of the fixed assets of the thrift (such as buildings, fixtures, equipment) that may be sold 
at a discount when the thrift is resolved.  For sample thrifts, total net fixed assets are $1.96 
billion. We assume the discount on these assets is 10 percent, which gives us resolution- 
related costs associated with fixed assets of  $0.20 billion and prompt resolution costs of 
$7.64 billion. Second, the 55 thrifts with positive SNW are assigned a zero cost of prompt 
resolution. Deducting the $185 million in SNW in  these thrifts (see table IV) from the sample 
total gives a prompt resolution cost of $7.66 billion. 
Finally, we need to make an  adjustment to SNW to account for administrative and 
legal costs associated with closing and resolving the forbearance thrifts. We therefore deduct 
0.5 percent of total assets from the SNW estimate. We arrive at a cost of 0.5 percent by 
dividing the insurance settlement and administrative expenses for FSLIC in  1985 and 1986 
reported by  the U.S. GAO (1987b) by  total failed thrift assets in  1985 and 1986 reported in 
Barth  (1991, table 3-2). The total projected administrative costs associated with prompt 
resolution and the estimated cost of prompt resolution are $0.7 billion and $8.36 billion.I8 
I7~ecause  we use a version of the Kane-Yu formula that does not fully take into account prepayment when 
calculating synthetic market values for the mortgage and mortgage-backed security portfolios, our estimates of 
SNW are likely to overstate the size of the losses (understate the true market net worth). 
l8 We do not adjust prompt resolution costs to take into account the value of thrift charters.  In cases where 
the FSLIC or RTC sells the insured deposits or resolves the failed thrift by  selling it (often net of problem 
assets) to another depository institution or investor group, any purchase premium paid reflects the residual value 
of the thrift as an ongoing concern, or rather its charter value. However, Kane and Unal (1990) and Thomson 
(1  987, 1992) argue that one component of charter value is the capitalized value of future deposit insurance 
subsidies.  To the extent that the purchase premium reflects the capitalized value of future subsidies, it should 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmC.  Estimates of Future Resolution Costs 
To estimate future resolution costs, we tracked all 952 thrifts from December 1979 through 
July  1992. We used the Office of Thrift Supervision's (OTS) merger history file, various 
issues of Thomson Savings Directory (formerly Rand McNallyfs, The  U.  S. Savings 
Institutions Directory), and lists of FSLIC-insured (FDIC-SAIF insured) thrift institutions that 
were closed between January 1, 1980 and July 3  1, 1992 from Barth et al. (1989) and from the 
RTC." 
The 952 forbearance thrifts can be divided into four general categories:  independent 
and still operating as of July 3  1, 1992; in RTC conservatorship as of July 3 1, 1992; merged 
into another thrift; or closed.  This sample of thrifts breaks down as follows: 186 are still 
operating as independent institutions, 194 merged into an ongoing independent thrift, and  11 
were acquired by  banks. Nine sample thrifts are currently in RTC conservatorship, and 
another 20 merged into a thrift currently in RTC conservatorship. The remaining 532 thrifts 
either failed outright or merged into a thrift that was subsequently closed:  361 were closed 
directly, 68 merged into another forbearance thrift before it was closed, and the remaining 103 
merged into a non-sample thrift that was later closed.20 
not be  viewed as reducing FSLIC resolution costs. 
I9we are indebted to Robert Grohol of  the RTC for providing us with the list of RTC resolutions 
(including resolution costs) and with the list of RTC conservatorships through the end of  1991.  We are also 
indebted to  Steve Watson of the OTS for providing us with the merger history file.  Information on RTC 
resolutions and conservatorships for  1992 was obtained from the RTC Review and from the corporation's press 
releases. 
''of  the 34 thrifts that were dropped from the sample because they were merged out of existence in 1980, 
13 merged into currently ongoing (as of June 30, 1992) thrifts, two merged into thrifts now in RTC 
conservatorship, and 19 merged into thrifts that were subsequently closed. 
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1988, the estimated resolution cost to the FSLIC at the time of closing is obtained from 
Barth, Bartholomew, and Bradley (1989, appendix 1-9).  Estimated resolution costs to the 
RTC at the time of closing for thrifts closed from January  1, 1989 through July 31, 1992 are 
obtained from the RTC. 
The FSLIC and RTC resolution costs are estimates of the total cost of resolving the 
thrift made at the time of closing.  A recent paper by  Blalock, Curry, and Elmer (1991) 
suggests that at least the FSLIC estimates significantly understate actual resolution costs: 
Between 1984 and  1987, these costs were understated on average by  26 percent.  For thrifts 
resolved through liquidation, FSLIC estimates were even worse, undershooting actual 
resolution costs on average by  35.3 percent. 
A second source of bias in  these estimates is that they are costs to the FSLIC and 
therefore do not include the value of tax benefits the FSLIC may  have passed on to acquires. 
Barth, Bartholomew, and Elmer (1989) find that for resolutions done in  1988, each dollar of 
tax benefits passed on to an acquirer of a failed thrift lowered the FSLIC's resolution cost by 
98 cents.  However, in  such deals, the total cost to taxpayers is higher by  the amount of these 
tax benefits, and reported costs to the FSLIC may  understate total resolution costs by  as much 
as 13 percent (see Blalock, Curry, and Elmer). Therefore, the use of FSLIC resolution cost 
estimates biases us against accepting the null hypothesis. 
Closed 1- 
For the 361 forbearance thrifts that were closed as independent institutions, direct 
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misleading when evaluating forbearance because it does not take into account the time value 
of money.  Therefore, we discount these resolution costs back to June 30, 1980, using the 
nominal yield on equivalent maturity Treasury debt.  As shown in  table V, we assume that 
closings take place evenly throughout the year; therefore, for discounting purposes, we assume 
all closures during the interval from January through December occur on June 30.  The 
present value of estimated resolution costs for these 361 closed thrifts is $20.34 billion. 
Open Institutions 
Unfortunately for taxpayers, the costs associated with closed institutions are only a 
part of the total direct costs of forbearance.  A large number of thrift institutions have yet to 
be closed by  the OTS or resolved by  the RTC.  As of July 3  1, 1992, 186 of our original 
sample thrifts were independent, ongoing institutions and another nine were operating under 
RTC conservatorship.  All of the conservatorship institutions and a number of the independent 
open thrifts will require government intervention at a cost to the taxpayer. 
Tables VI and VII present a breakdown of  the 186 sample thrifts in private hands and 
the nine sample thrifts in  conservatorship, respectively, by  TNW as of July 3  1, 1992.  For 
open thrifts, five institutions with a total of $6.51 billion in  assets and TNW of 40.35 billion 
had negative TNW.  Another  12 thrifts with $6.94 billion in  assets had less than 2 percent 
TNWA, and thus failed to meet the minimum net worth requirement for continued operation 
in the prompt intervention rules established by  Title I11  of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of  1991 (FDICIA).  Finally, 43 additional institutions with 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm$27.89 billion in assets had less than 4 percent TNWA  and were therefore under~apitalized.~' 
Table VII shows that potential problems are obvious among conservatorship thrifts.  This 
suggests that further problems remain, increasing the realized cost of forbearance to taxpayers. 
Moreover, problem assets (consisting of nonperforming loans and repossessed assets) on the 
books of these thrifts are 163 percent of TNW and more than  5 percent of total assets. 
Using the RTC's loss experience of 27.4 percent of initial total assets for all resolved 
institutions from its inception through July 31,  1992, projected losses could be as high as 
$1 1.16 billion ($3.39 billion discounted back  to June 1980) for 86 undercapitalized open 
thrifts and $2.28 billion ($0.70 billion discounted value) for conservatorship thrifts. Using a 
more conservative estimate of 15 percent of total assets, projected losses would be $6.02 
billion and $1.25 billion ($1.85 billion and $0.38 billion discounted value) for open and 
conservatorship thrifts, respectively.  A true projection of losses in unresolved nonviable 
thrifts would require a two- or three-step procedure as in Barth, Bartholomew, and Bradley 
(1990).22 However, the estimates in this paper highlight the fact that a nontrivial part of the 
cost of forbearance is represented by  embedded losses in yet-to-be-resolved insolvent thrifts. 
.  . 
21 FIRREA (1 989) mandates that savings and loan institutions' capital requirements be no less stringent 
than those of national banks.  FIRREA mandates minimum capita1 standards for savings and loan institutions of 
1.5 percent TNWA and 3 percent GAAP net worth to total assets.  However, the actual capital requirement in 
FIRREA turned out to be more stringent than the language indicates, because in addition to these two minimum 
capital rules, the statute mandates that thrift capital requirements be no less stringent than those for national 
banks.  Except for banks that gamer the top rating on their last bank examination, the minimum leveraging 
requirement for national banks is 4 percent Tier 1 capital (which is essentially TNW)  to total assets.  Thrift 
capital standards are dealt with in Section 301 of FIRREA (1  989.  P. L. 10  1-73).  For a discussion of bank 
capital standards, see Huber (1991, ch.  15). 
22 For a review of  the literature on estimating resolution costs, see Bradley (1992). 
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Accounting for losses associated with forbearance thrifts that are merged out of 
existence often requires a judgment call.  In some cases it may  be appropriate to allocate a 
portion of the resolution costs associated with an institution that acquired a sample thrift.  An 
example is a supervisory merger, in  which no direct assistance was provided, but the intent 
was to prevent the failure of the forbearance thrift.  These cases are not treated as closures by 
the thrift regulators and are assumed to have been  done at zero cost to the deposit insurance 
fund or to the RTC.  However, Barth (1991) notes that in many of these deals, tax benefits 
were passed on to the acquirer and thus were costly to the taxpayer.  Moreover, in a number 
of cases, especially as the financial condition of the FSLIC deteriorated, supervisory mergers 
were used as a way  of delaying the recognition of  losses as insolvent or marginally 
capitalized thrifts were merged into other weak  institutions. 
As reported in Barth  (1 991, table 3-2), of the  1,13 1 mergers that occurred between 
1980 and  1988, 333 (29 percent) were supervisory mergers. Because we do not have 
information on  whether a merger was a private or a supervisory merger, we treat all 
forbearance thrifts that are acquired by  a nonsample thrift or bank  as a private merger with 
zero resolution costs.  This, of course, biases us against accepting the null hypothesis that 
forbearance was costly to taxpayers because, as noted earlier, supervisory mergers had real 
costs to the taxpayer even though FSLIC's reported loss was zero.23 
23  Note, for example, that  103 forbearance thrifts were  acquired by  thrifts that eventually failed at a total 
cost of  $30.61 billion ($12.06 billion discounted to June  30, 1980).  To the extent supervisory mergers were 
used as a loss delay mechanism, some portion of the  $12 billion present-value resolution cost is a direct cost of 
forbearance. 
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As discussed earlier, the direct cost of forbearance is the difference between the cost of 
prompt resolution, which we define as government action to close market-value-insolvent 
institutions in  1980, and the present value of costs associated with closing thrifts in the future. 
Using Kane-Yu's method for computing synthetic net worth, along with some adjustments for 
bankruptcy costs, we arrive at a cost of prompt resolution of $8.36 billion. 
For the 361 sample thrifts that were resolved directly by  the FSLIC or the RTC, the 
present value of estimated resolution costs is $20.34 billion.  In other words, the cost 
associated with just those thrifts already closed exceeds the estimated cost of prompt 
resolution by  $1 1.98 billion.  In fact, it exceeds our estimated upper-bound prompt resolution 
cost of $14.71 billion by  $6.73 billion.24 Moreover, a more complete accounting for losses 
would include the costs associated with supervisory mergers and the embedded losses in yet- 
to-be-resolved forbearance thrifts, both of which would further increase the cost of 
forbearance.  Clearly, forbearance was a losing proposition for taxpayers. 
W.  Conclusion 
This paper explicitly looks at the forbearance bet taken by  policymakers at the end of 
the  1970s. Forbearance is defined as the failure of regulators to enforce book  capital standards 
at the end of  1979.  By  comparing the cost of prompt regulatory intervention (defined here as 
closure or reorganization of capital-deficient thrifts in  1980) with the estimated resolution cost 
24 The upper bound of prompt resolution cost is obtained by  deducting administrative and legal costs ($0.7 
billion), as well as the loss on fixed assets ($0.2 billion) from our highest estimate, in absolute-value terms, of 
SNW. 
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likely to require regulatory intervention, we  fail to reject the null hypothesis that forbearance 
was a bad bet for taxpayers. 
This paper provides direct evidence that forbearance contributed to the ultimate loss to 
taxpayers from the resolution of the thrift insurance mess. In fact, their losses grew despite 
the dramatic downturn in interest rates after 1982, which was a necessary event for taxpayers 
to win the forbearance bet. This result is in  contrast to those in Benston and Carhill (1992), 
which suggest that forbearance was not costly. 
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NET AS SETS^  ROA' 
Notes: 
Number of observations in the sample is 952. 
NA  - not applicable. 
a)  Includes all subportfolios for which synthetic market values are computed. Does not include other 
assets and other liabilities. 
b)  Mean subportfolio assets net of slow loans.  Unit is thousands of dollars. 
c)  Mean ROA: return on assets = subportfolio income divided by  net assets. 
d)  Percent of total assets = 100 times the ratio of mean subportfolio assets to mean total assets. 
Sources:  Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Thr*  Financial Reporr; and authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 111:  Unbooked Losses (Gains) in Asset and Liability Subportfolios, December 1979 
SUBPORTFOLIO  BV-MVa  PDR~  (BV-MV)/TNW' 
Mortgages  8,186.09  0.0668  1.4503 
Mortgage-Backed Securities  1,307.70  0.1432  0.23 17 










a)  Unbooked loss on the subportfolio.  Unit is thousands of dollars. 
b)  Pseudo-default rate = unbooked gain or loss as a percent of subportfolio assets. 
C)  Unbooked loss on the subportfolio divided by  tangible net worth. 
d)  Slow loans net of valuation allowances.  Assumed loss rate on these assets is 50 percent. 
Sources:  Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Thrifr Financial Reporf; and authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable IV: Sample Thrifts in December 1979 by  Ratio of Synthetic Net Worth to Assets 
SAMPLE 
THRIFTS WITH 
0.00 < SNWA~ 
-0.05 < SNWA I  0.00 
-0.10 < SNWA I  -0.05 
-0.15 < SNWA I  -0.10 
SNWA I -0.15 
TOTAL 
TANGIBLE 
NUMBER  NET WORTH' 




a)  Unit is millions of dollars. 
b)  Synthetic net worth to total assets. 
Sources:  Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Thrift Financial Report; and authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable V: Discounted  Expected Resolution Costs for Closed Institutions,  1981-1992 
TIME OF CLOSING' 
RESOLUTION 
COSP  PV  COST 
Notes:  PV(Reso1ution Cost) = (Estimated Resolution Cost in year n)* l/(l+r)" 
a)  Future time period in which thrift was closed. 
b)  Number of periods to discount back. 
c)  Discount rate for payment n periods into the future.  From table  1.36, "Interest Rates and Capital 
Markets," Federal Reserve Bulletin (March  1979), p. A27. 
d)  Estimated resolution cost at time of closing.  Unit is millions of dollars. 
e)  Present-value cost on June 30, 1980.  Unit is millions of dollars. 
Sources:  Barth, Bartholomew, and Bradley (1989); Resolution Trust Corporation case files and press 
releases;  RTC Review; and authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable VI:  Condition of Open Sample Thrifts on July 31, 1992 
OPEN SAMPLE 
THRIFTS WITH'  NUMBER  ASSETSb 
0.05  < TNWAc  8  6  3 1,453.794 
0.04 < TNWA 5  0.05  40  26,3  14.068 
0.03  < TNWA 1  0.04  29  21,936.661 
0.02  < TNWA 5  0.03  14  5,595.887 
0.01 < TNWA 5  0.02  7  5,681.919 
0.00 < TNWA 1  0.01  5  1,257.521 
TNWA < 0.00  5  6,5  12.003 
TOTAL  186  97,494.332 
TANGIBLE  PROBLEM 
NET  WORTH^  AS SETS^ 
2,560.962  1,262.906 
Notes: 
a)  Data are  from the December 3 1, 199  1  Thrifr Financial Report. 
b)  Unit is millions of dollars. 
c)  Tangible net worth to total assets. 
Sources:  Office of Thrift Supervision, Thrifr Financial Report; and authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable VII:  Condition of Sample Thrifts in RTC Conservatorship on July 31, 1992 
CONSERVATORSHIP  TANGIBLE  PROBLEM 
THRIFTS WITH'  NUMBER  ASSETSb  NET WORTHb  AS SETS^ 
0.00 < TNWA"  1  5,459.726  7.693  1,670.290 
-0.01 < TNWA 5 0.00  2  374.803  -0.430  57.139 
-0.02 < TNWA 5 -0.01  1  78.708  -1.064  23.554 
-0.03 < TNWA I  -0.02  2  960.766  -24.217  80.930 
TNWA I -0.03  7  1,428.387  -220.596  205.397 
- 
TOTAL  9  8,302.390  -238.614  2,03 7.3 10 
Notes: 
a)  Data are from the December 3 1.  199  1 Thrvt Financial Report. 
b)  Unit is millions of dollars. 
C) Tangible net worth to total assets. 
Sources:  Office of Thrift Supervision, Thrg  Financial Report; and authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix A 
Computations of the Minimum Capital Requirement for Thrifts 
The capital requirement for thrifts in  1979 was 
RAPNW 2  Max[MNWFIR, MNWACZ], 
where 
MNWFIR = minimum net worth by  the federal insurance reserve test,  . 
MNWACI = minimum net worth by  the asset composition test. 
The MNWFIR comprises the applicable federal insurance reserve, plus 20 percent of 
scheduled items, plus 5 percent of the principal amount of unsecured borrowing (excluding 
borrowings from Federal Home Loan Banks and state-chartered central reserve institutions) 
with an original stated maturity greater than one year. The federal insurance reserve is 
computed as a percent of deposit liabilities, which increases with the number of years the 
institution has been in operation (beginning with 0.5 percent for two years and increasing by 
25 basis points each year to a maximum of 5  percent). 
The MNWACI is a risk-adjusted capital standard in which asset and liability categories have 
the following net worth requirements: 
First mortgage loans and contracts: 
Insured or guaranteed loans: 2% 
Conventional mortgage loans on one- to four-family dwellings: 5% 
Conventional mortgage loans on multifamily dwellings (> 4):  5% 
Conventional mortgage loans on other improved real estate: 6% 
Conventional mortgage loans on developed lots and sites: 7% 
Conventional mortgage loans on  land (undeveloped and for acquisition and 
development): 8% 
Nonconforming mortgage loans and contracts to facilitate the sale of  real 
estate: 8% 
Other loans: 
Insured or guaranteed loans for property alteration or repair: 3% 
Other loans for property alteration or repair: 5% 
Insured or guaranteed educational loans: 2% 
Other educational loans: 6% 
Insured or guaranteed mobile home or chattel paper: 3% 
Other mobile home or chattel paper: 3% 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFormulae for Net Worth Requirements 
MNWFIR =  SVGL3261 + 0.20*[SVGL0697 + SVGL0070 + SVGL0703 + SVGL0706 + SVGL0709 + 
SVGL0712 + SVGL0715 + SVGL0718 + SVGL072 1 + SVGL0724 + SVGL0727 + 
SVGL0730 + SVGL0733 + SVGL0736 + SVGL 0739 + SVGL0742 + SVGL0745 + 
SVGL0748 + SVGL0751 + SVGL0754 + SVGL0757 + SVGL0760 + SVGL0763 + 
SVGL0766 + SVGL0769 + SVGL0772  + SVGL0775 + SVGL0796 + SVGL0778 + 
SVGL0781 + SVGL0784 + SVGL0787 + SVGL07901 + 0.05*SVGL2658. 
MNWACI =  0.02*(SVGL1436 + SVGL1437 + SVGL1438 + SVGL1439 + SVGL1465 + SVGL1441 + 
SVGL1442 + SVGL 1443 - SVGL1454 + SVGL1462 + SVGL 1455 + SVGL1481) + 
0.03*(SVGL2055 + SVGL0857 + SVGL0858 + SVGL2036 + SVGL0853 + SVGL0854 + 
SVGLO855 + SVGL0872) + 0.05*(SVGL1444 + SVGL1446 + SVGL2056 + SVGL213O) + 
0.06*(SVGL1470 + SVGL1448 + SVGL1463 + SVGL2039 + SVGL1991 + SVGL1468 + 
SVGL 1469) + 0.07*(SVGL 1447 + SVGL1493 - SVGL 1498 - SVGL 1497) + 0.08*(SVGL1449 
+ SVGL1451 + SVGL 1452 + SVGL1453 - SVGL1457) + 0.10*(SVGL1467 + SVGL1483 + 
SVGL0859 - SVGL1482 -  SVGL1492 - SVGL1491) + .05*SVGL2658. 
Certain aggregation problems are associated with the construction of the asset composition 
index (ACI).  When approximations were necessary, we intentionally constructed the index so 
that it would understate the true ACI. This causes us to undersample thrifts not meeting 
capital requirements, but we omit only those that are very close to meeting the requirements. 
Our ACI differs from the true ACI in the following ways: 
a)  MNWACI should include 0.1 5*(unsecured consumer loans). However, we cannot get a 
separate item for this because it is included in  SVGL1991.  Therefore, it is implicitly 
weighted at 0.06 in MNWACI. 
b)  Other nonconsumer loans, SVGL1469, is not included in any of the asset categories.  We 
include it in  the MNWACI at a 0.06 weight (the same weight as secured consumer loans). 
c)  Accrued interest is added at the minimum weight for the asset category.  Depreciation and 
valuation allowances are subtracted at the maximum weight for the asset category.  The 
weights are as follows: 
Accrued interest: 
Mortgage loans: SVGL1455 (weight 0.02) 
Other loans: SVGL1481 (weight 0.02) 
Valuation allowance: 
Mortgage loans: SVGL1457 (weight 0.08) 
Other loans: SVGL1482 (weight 0.10) 
Real estate loans: SVGL1492 (weight 0.10) 
Other real estate: SVGL1498 (weight 0.07) 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmDepreciation allowance: 
Real estate: SVGL1491 (weight 0.10). 
Other real estate: SVGL1497 (weight 0.07). 
The SVGL items are from the FHLBB Management Information System Semiannual 
Financial Report, commonly known as the  Thrw Financial Report.  See the report's glossary 
for definitions of specific SVGL items. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix B 
Composition of Thrift Asset and Liability Subportfolios 
Mortgages 
MLN =  SVGL0902 + SVGL1444 + SVGL1446 + SVGL1470 + SVGL1447 + 
SVGL1448 + SVGL1449 + SVGL1451+ SVGL1452 + SVGL1453 - SVGL0695 
- SVGLO698 - SVGLO701 -  SVGLO704 - SVGL0707 - SVGL0710 - SVGLO713 
- SVGL0716 - SVGL0719 - SVGLO722 - SVGL0725 - SVGL0728 - SVGL073  1 
- SVGLO734 - SVGLO737 - SVGL3067 - SVGL0767 - SVGLO770 
Mortgage-Backed &Pass-Through  Contracts 
MBS =  SVGL1454 - SVGLO779 
Investment Securities 
SEC =  SVGLO851 + SVGLO854 - SVGLO782 
Other Loans  -- 
OLN =  SVGL1467 +  SVGL1458 +  SVGL2055 +  SVGL2056 +  SVGL1462 + 
SVGL1463 +  SVGL1468 +  SVGL2036 +  SVGL2039 +  SVGLlggl + 
SVGL1469 - SVGLO740 - SVGLO743 - SVGLO746 - SVGLO749 - SVGLO752 - 
SVGL0755 - SVGL0758 - SVGL0761 - SVGL0764 -  SVGL3068 
Real Estate 
REH =  SVGL2150 + SVGL1493 + SVGL1494 (real estate held) 
RE0 =  SVGL1483 + SVGL1484 (repossessed real estate) 
Service Con>. Subsidiaries 
SCS =  SVGL2  130 
Mortga~e-Servicing  Rights 
MSR =  SVGL0820 (balance of mortgages serviced for others) 
FHLBB Advances 
ADVl =  SVGL2651  (advances < 1 year) 
ADV2 =  SVGL2652  (advances > 1 year) 
Borrowings 
OBMl =  SVGL2653 + SVGL2654 + SVGL2657  (other borrowed money < 1 year) 
OMB2 =  SVGL2658  (other borrowed money > 1 year) 
OMB3 =  SVGL2659  (mortgages on association premises) 
MBB =  SVGL0850  (mortgage-backed bonds) 
SUB =  SVGL3200  (subordinated debt) 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFixed-Rate Devosits 
FRD =  SVGL6645 + SVGL6647 
Slow Loans 
SLWLN =  0.2*[SVGL0697 +  SVGL0700 + SVGL0703 + SVGL0706 +  SVGL0709 + 
SVGL0712 +  SVGL0715 + SVGL07181 + SVGL0721 +  SVGL0724 + 
SVGLO727 +  SVGLO730 +  SVGLO733 +  SVGL0736 +  SVGLo739 + 
SVGLO742 +  SVGLO745 +  SVGL0748 +  SVGLo75 1 +  svGLo754 + 
SVGL0757 +  SVGLO760 +  SVGLO763 +  SVGL0766 +  SVGLo769 + 
SVGLO772 +  SVGLO781 +  SVGL0784 
Tangible Net Worth 
TNW =  SVGL3339 - SVGL0868 - SVGLO869 - SVGLO871 
Formulae for Book Return on Asset Sub~ortfolios 
MLN, =  SVGL403  1 + SVGL4041 + SVGL4038 + SVGL4033 + SVGL4034 + 
SVGL1455*[MLNl(MLN + MBS)] + SVGL0870*(0.1199)*[MLN/(MLN  + 
SVGLO820)] 
MBS, = SVGL4032 + SVGL1455*[MBS/(MLN + MBS)] 
OLN, = (SVGL4036 + SVGL1481)lOLN 
MSR, =  SVGL4039lSVGL0820 + SVGL0870*(0.11990*[SVGL0820/(MLN+SVGL0870)] 
- .0025 (net mortgage servicing income) 
ADV, = SVGL4 173/(SVGL265  1 + SVGL2652) 
MBB, = SVGL4175lSVGL0850  (if  SVGL0850 > 0, zero otherwise) 
SUB,  = SVGL4200lSVGL3200 (if  SVGL3200 > 0, zero otherwise) 
FRD, = SVGL4,163I(SVGL6645 + SVGL6647) 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix C 
Asset and Liability Subportfolio Rates of Return and Maturity Assumptions 
SUBPORTFOLIO  r '  mb  SOURCE 
- 
Mortgages  0.1 164  12  FHLBB primary market series of average effective interest rates 
on loans closed  for December 1979, assuming prepayment at the 
end of  10 years.  From table 1.55, "Mortgage Markets," Federal 






0.1135  12  Government National Mortgage Association secondary 
market series of average net yields on a pool of 30-year FHANA 
mortgages, assuming prepayment in  12 years.  See mortgage 
subportfolio for reference. 
0.1042  5  Five-year Treasury bond rate. From table  1.36, "Interest Rates: 
Money and Capital Markets,"  Federal Reserve Bulletin (March 
1980). p. A27. 
0.089  2  Average annual appreciation of commercial real estate for the U.S. 
during  1978 and  1979.  This rate is derived from table 6-10 in 
White [1991]. 
0.1412  5  Return on the loan portfolio for national banks.  From Office of 
Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Report, 1979, pp. B-19 and 
B-22. 
Mortgage-Servicing  0.1164  12  Discounted at the same rate as the mortgage-backed 
Rights  securities (MBS).  See MBS portfolio for reference. 
Service Corp.  0.174  NA  Annual return on the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Market Index 
Subsidiaries  for 1979. 
FHLBB Advances 
(<  1 year)  0.1342  %  Six-month secondary market CD rate and effective yield on 
(> 1 year)  0.1136  3.47  three-year CDs (computed as the sum of  the three-year Treasury 
rate plus the six-month CD-T-bill spread). T-bill rates are 
converted to an equivalent bond yield.  From table  1.36, "Interest 
Rates: Money and Capital Markets," Federal Reserve Bulletin 
(March  1980), p. A27.  Maturity information for FHLBB 
advances is from Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Annual 
Report, 1979, p.  120. 
Borrowings 
OBMc (< 1 year)  0.1342  %  Six-month secondary market CD rate and effective yield 
OBM  ( > 1 year)  0.1136  3.47  on three-year CDs.  Computation of rates, maturity assumptions, 
and sources are the same as for FHLBB advances. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmMortgages on  0.1 164  12  Government National Mortgage Association secondary market 
Premises  series of average net yields on a pool of 30-year FHANA 
Mortgage-Backed  mortgages, assuming then-current rates and a  12-year prepayment. 
Bonds  From table  1.55, "Mortgage Markets,"Federal Reserve Bulletin 
(March 1980), p. A40. 
Subordinated Debt  0.1 149  9  For subordinated debt, we use Moody's seasoned bond issue from 
table  1.36, "Interest Rates:  Money and Capital Markets," Federal 
Reserve Bulletin (March 1980), p.  A27.  Maturity information for 
subordinated debt is taken from Avery, Belton, and Goldberg 
(1 988). 
Fixed-Rate Deposits  0.1204  2  Two-year Treasury note yield plus the six-month CD-T-bill spread. 
From table 1.36, "Interest Rates:  Money and Capital Markets," 
Federal Reserve Bulletin (March 1  980). p. A27. 
-  -  - - 
Notes: 
a) The alternative market rate for the subportfolio used to construct synthetic market value.  Market rates of 
return are average annual yields for December 1979. 
b)  Maturity of the subportfolio used in constructing the synthetic market value. 
c)  Other borrowed money. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix D 
Formulae for Computing Synthetic Market Value' 
MLN,,  =  (MLNilO.  1  164)*[1  -(I. 1  164)'"]1[1  -(I +MLN~)"~]*MLN 
OLN,,  = (OLN,/O.  1412)*[1-(1.1412)"]1[1 -(~+OLN,)"]*OLN 
SCS,,  = SCS  if  SVGL2130 < 0 
= SCS  if  SVGL4045 < 0 
= SVGL404510.1  otherwise 
REALMv  = REO* 1.186 + REH*  1.186 
MSRMv  =  MSRINC*6.3855 (12 year annuity at 11.64 percent)  if  SVGLO82O >O 
0  otherwise 
ADV 1 ,,  =  (ADV,IO. 1342)*  [ 1  -(1.067 l)".']l[l-(1  +ADV~/~)".']*ADV  1 
MBB,,  = (MBB,IO. 1  164)*[1-(1.1 164)-'2]1[1  -(l+MBBi)-I2]*MBB 
SUB,,  = (SUB,IO. 1149)*[1 - (1.1 149)4]1[1-(1+SUBJ']*SUB 
SLWLN,,  = O.SeSLWLN 
Notes:  a)  Market discount rates in the formulae are described in appendix C. 
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